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I.

Introduction
The spring months of 1968 marked a period of transformation across Czechoslovakia in

both leadership and political culture. Popularity for hard-line communist leader Antonín Novotný
dwindled among the Czech people since his assumption of office in 1957 as a result of his
policies, which severely censored the press and deprived citizens of personal freedoms. Tensions
boiled over in January leading to the ousting of Novotný from public office. He was quickly
replaced by a more progressive figure of the party named Alexander Dubček. As a reformist who
sought to loosen the rigid media, speech, and travel restrictions established by Novotný,
Dubček’s influence on the psyche of the Czech people played a crucial role in shaping the social
and political landscape of the country. Ultimately, Dubček’s reforms emboldened ordinary
citizens to further engage in democratic liberalization efforts and mass protests that would soon
become known as the Prague Spring. While these changes were embraced among the people of
Czechoslovakia, as a satellite state of the Soviet Union, they were not as welcomed by
authorities in Moscow. Thus, on August 20, 1968, the armies of the Soviet Union, Poland,
Hungary, East Germany, and Bulgaria invaded Czechoslovakia to put a halt to this
counter-revolution, thereby marking the start of the Warsaw Pact invasion.
The following research aims to reveal how the Warsaw Pact invasion influenced the 1968
United States presidential election. These findings suggest that the invasion bolstered Republican
candidate Richard Nixon’s campaign and helped to secure a win against Hubert Humphrey, the
Democratic candidate, for three key reasons. First, the American press provided extensive
coverage on the events transpiring in Central Europe and emphasized contempt from the
American public toward their government’s reaction to the invasion. Second, Humphrey, who
served as vice president in 1968, continued to take the fall for President Lyndon B. Johnson’s
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foreign policy dubbed “No Action” by many Americans who felt sympathetic toward what was
perceived as Czechoslovakia’s democratic cause. Finally, the invasion set the stage for Nixon to
engage more readily in political posturing throughout his campaign as the Warsaw Pact invasion
reaffirmed for many Americans the real military threat posed by the Soviet Union, and allowed
the Republican Party to reinforce its image as staunch anti-communists. For these reasons, the
Warsaw Pact invasion presented an advantageous moment for Nixon and the Republican Party to
posture politically, increase their base of support, and secure the presidency.
Within the United States, various individuals perceived the context of the invasion
differently. To some, it reflected reoccurring themes within the Cold War relating to nuclear
proliferation and Soviet power over satellite states, while for others it was overshadowed by the
ongoing Vietnam War. As an indication of public opinion, these perspectives informed the
government’s relatively indifferent response to the events unfolding in Czechoslovakia. The
timing of the invasion was unique as it took place at the height of the 1968 presidential election,
occurring just before the Democratic National Convention and just after the Republican National
Convention. Richard Nixon won the nomination for the Republican Party candidate, and Hubert
Humphrey stood on the side of the Democratic Party. Thus, candidates on both sides utilized
public appearances, speeches, and interactions with the press to frame the Warsaw Pact invasion
as part of a larger, ongoing issue within the scope of the Cold War and the shattered prospect of
nuclear disarmament between the two superpowers.

II.

Scholarly Approaches
The nuances of the Warsaw Pact invasion and foreign response are well-explored, but

there remains a gap in the critical literature concerning how this international event impacted the
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outcome of the 1968 presidential election. Works such as Prague’s 200 Days by Harry Schwartz
provide a necessary historical context of the landscape of Czechoslovakia during this formative
year. Schwartz emphasizes the dynamics between the different political groups trying to achieve
incompatible objectives as some focused on liberalizing the country while others concerned
themselves with following what the Soviet Union expected of satellite states like Czechoslovakia.
These clashing ideals ultimately fostered a social and political climate characterized by the
Soviet Union as rebellious, thereby setting the stage for confrontation—in this case, the Warsaw
Pact invasion. Schwartz clarifies that the invasion, carried out to thwart Prague Spring, did not
constitute a mere blip on the radar to much of the world despite the United States treating it as
such in their response of indifference.
By establishing a timeline of the events that initiated the Warsaw Pact Invasion in August
1968, it becomes clear, according to Schwartz, that the changes taking place in Czechoslovakia
were revolutionary and should be treated as such by current scholars. One example of this is
emphasized by the suicide of Dr. Jozef Brestanksy, the Vice President of Czechoslovakia’s
Supreme Court, following the shift in leadership earlier in the year. According to Schwartz, “The
suicides symbolized the despair of many who had been linked to the old regime. In a mere three
months, they had seen their comfortable world vanishing along with the premises on which
Novotnyites had built careers and won good jobs.”1 By illustrating broad concepts of the social
and political scene brought on by the Prague Spring with specific narratives, like the one of Dr.
Brestanksy, Schwartz demonstrates the monumental shift taking place within Czechoslovakia
that challenged the status quo the Soviet Union aimed to uphold. With this background
1
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information, it becomes clear that the Warsaw Pact invasion, carried out to thwart Prague Spring,
was not just a blip on the radar to much of the world despite the United States treating it as such
in their response of indifference.
Other scholars such as Luke Nichter have explored public sentiment toward President
Johnson and his administration during this period. In Lyndon B. Johnson: Pursuit of Populism,
Paradox of Power Nichter illustrates the contempt that many Americans held toward President
Johnson and his leadership capabilities due to the manner in which he approached a number of
international conflicts like the Vietnam War and, subsequently, the Warsaw Pact invasion.
Nichter’s work exemplifies how this shift in public opinion toward Johnson impacted Humphrey
in the presidential election given their close ties as President and Vice President.
Nichter cites polls to demonstrate that in 1968 only 39 percent of Americans approved of
President Johnson’s leadership as a result of the Vietnam War. 2 Thus, the Vietnam War
complicated the situation in Czechoslovakia for President Johnson as many Americans already
felt displeased with his leadership in the realm of foreign policy. Additionally, the Vietnam War
had overshadowed much of what was taking place in Eastern Europe prior to the invasion; the
conflict was at the forefront of politics, conversation, and everyday life, ultimately minimizing
the attention given to other areas of foreign policy. According to Nichter, Europeans and
Americans alike believed Cold War tensions had decreased during the 1960s in part due to the
prevalence of the Vietnam War; not only did the Warsaw Pact invasion shatter these widespread
beliefs, but it also reopened tensions between the United States and Soviet Union.3
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Finally, historian Kyle Longley has made significant contributions in understanding the
complexity of the Johnson administration in his book LBJ’s 1968: Power, Politics, and the
Presidency in America’s Year of Upheaval. While Longley agrees with other scholars that 1968
was a particularly turbulent year for the United States, his approach differs in that he actually
champions Johnson’s ability to confront the various crises that emerged. Longley highlights that
Johnson actually proceeded with patience and care when responding to the events transpiring in
Eastern Europe. He claims that Johnson’s response reflected his recognition of the lack of
options available to him post-invasion, given the fact that the United States was overextended in
Vietnam.4 In doing so, Longley puts forth a different framework of analysis from other scholars
that is empathetic toward Johnson.
Previous scholarship has addressed various facets of the Soviet invasion of
Czechoslovakia: the dynamics of political factions in Prague at this time, the blunders Johnson
made during the Vietnam War, and how the events shaped public opinion toward the
administration. This shift in public sentiment, and the events taking place in America in 1968
coincided and ultimately reflected the decision by the Soviet Union to invade Czechoslovakia.
Section one analyzes the various ways in which the media portrayed the Warsaw Pact
invasion of Prague and how those portrayals connected with the American people. The media
was responsible for making these overseas events feel personal to ordinary American citizens and
thus exacerbated discontent towards the previous administration. Section two explores how
Humphrey inadvertently branded himself as a continuation of President Johnson through his
inability to establish a campaign that was distinct to him and his achievements. Because the
4
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public held many unfavorable feelings toward Johnson by the time of the election, more people
were inclined to support the Republican Party. Finally, section three explores the inner workings
of the Cold War and American perceptions of communism throughout this era that remained
closely intertwined with the invasion. The Republican Party monopolized on this connection as
an opportunity to uphold their reputation as vehement anti-communists and increase Nixon’s
base of support.

III.

President Johnson & “No Action”
Many have labeled the response of Johnson and his advisers towards the attack on

democracy in Czechoslovakia as “indifferent” and “careless,” while others have opted for an
interpretation that frames him as pragmatic in his approach.5 Regardless of their intent, the
Johnson administration’s response is best characterized by the term “No Action,” a phrase that
comes from his public speech the day after the election in which he called on Warsaw Pact allies
to withdraw from Czechoslovakia and epitomizes the President’s minimal action to quell the
situation.6 The consequences of the invasion hit Johnson hard as he spent most of 1968 trying to
make progress on peace agreements with Moscow in hopes that it would overshadow the
Vietnam War and serve as his legacy.7 Johnson faced a dilemma as he desperately wanted to
continue negotiations even in the wake of the invasion but knew it would send mixed messages
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to the American public and the rest of the world. In the eyes of voters, conducting business as
usual may as well have absolved the Soviet Union of their actions.
The global arena following the invasion was characterized by an overarching fear from
all parties to take the first steps. Johnson looked to the international community within NATO for
guidance but found little as NATO was equally depending on the United States and other
Western countries to serve as a model of action. A report from the Council on Foreign Relations
alludes to this very predicament:“The smaller allies, considering [the Warsaw Pact invasion] a
big crisis, thought the big countries should take the lead. Thus, for a variety of reasons—all
related to their internal politics—none of the members wanted to blow the opening whistle and
suggest a new target for NATO after Czechoslovakia.” 8 Additional briefings for National
Security Council meetings held in September reflect the same kind of action from the United
Nations; while there was certainty that the Soviet invasion would be the dominant theme of the
23rd United Nations General Assembly and debate as to how the General Assembly could
produce “a powerful expression of world opinion on the Czech crisis,” little substantive action
was taken.9
Ultimately, Johnson’s response to this conundrum was to lay low even in the midst of
pressure from international allies to take action. It was Johnson’s nonchalant demeanor in his
speeches and appearances following the invasion that caused many Americans to openly
condemn the administration via rallies, newspaper editorials, and public opinion polls for not
intervening. In an appearance with the press on the night of the invasion, Johnson seemed to
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disregard the urgency of the invasion and instead discussed concerns as mundane as his new
haircut and a movie he had seen recently.10 To the public, the Czech cause was one of democracy
and freedom, something that seemed American by nature and worth stepping in to protect. These
sentiments created discontent towards the Johnson administration, including Humphrey, that
would escalate in the months to come.

IV.

The Influence of the Media
The necessity of voting to fulfill one’s civic duty is an idea that has circulated for

decades, often escalating at the height of presidential elections. The election of 1968 proved no
different. Pamphlets distributed by employers in the months leading up to the election echo this
sentiment to their readers, declaring, “[Voting] is one of the greatest privileges granted to a
democratic people, and it should be the obligation of every United States’ citizen to become
informed and to vote on election day . . . Study the facts and vote for the team in whom you have
confidence to lead our country for the next four exciting years.”11 These kinds of reading
materials, held in the Presidential Campaign Mementos collection at the University of Chicago,
exude a sense of urgency that was prevalent in both the public discourse and the media in this
period that reflected how citizens and lawmakers alike found the 1968 election especially pivotal
for the country given the turbulence of the previous year.
Newspapers reinforced a similar sentiment, as demonstrated by an article published in the
The Christian Science Monitor entitled “Crisis Impact on Candidates.” The publication claimed
that Nixon had been “outstanding” at taking a stern line against communism, a position that
10
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would bolster his campaign in the presidential race.12 Nixon relied heavily on television to
engage in political posturing—both by reinforcing his commitment to containing communism in
the midst of Soviet aggression against Czechoslovakia and by chastising Humphrey and Johnson
for their lack of action in the wake of the invasion.13 This, to many, created an impression of the
Democrats as communist sympathizers, an advantageous take for Nixon to run with as the
election grew closer. Ultimately, the Warsaw Pact invasion ultimately contributed to Nixon’s
success because it offered a way for Nixon to elevate his own platform in a way that related to
what the American people were looking for, while simultaneously portraying Humphrey as a
candidate who would not be able to stand against communist aggression.
The obstacles that Hubert Humphrey confronted due to his close contact with President
Johnson proved to be exacerbated by the
media in the months leading up to
election. As such, the press assumed an
equally consequential role in shaping the
relationship between the Warsaw Pact
invasion and the 1968 election. In her dissertation titled “The Function of Television in the
Presidential Election Campaign of 1968,” Suzanne Cott highlights the following as relevant
functions of media in the scope of an election when she says, “The foregoing case studies reveal
that it is used to perform a variety of other campaign functions as well—opinion management,
12
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image building and detracting, manifest approval, entertainment, informing, recognition,
influencing opinion polls, avoidance, targeting and timing of appeals, confidence building, crowd
building, fundraising and news generating.”14 While Cott draws these conclusions from the
emergence of the television becoming an influential forum of discourse within an election space,
there is a degree of continuity that exists between video and print media as it relates to what it
can accomplish. The extent to which a media outlet covers a current event has the potential to
influence the perception of its subscribers. This is exactly what happened in the fall of 1968
leading up to election day.
Two critical components of media coverage stand out as being consequential in
reworking how the public perceived the invasion of Prague in 1968:the sheer amount of content
released and the nature of rhetoric utilized in the discussion. While the amount of press coverage
narrating the events unfolding in Czechoslovakia is indispensable to unearthing the relationship
between the invasion and the election outcome, these numbers alone do not tell the whole story.
Rather, analyzing the subtle distinctions in the language of these articles reveals a far more
nuanced understanding of the various biases at work, biases rooted in American nationalism and
anti-communist sentiments. These biases are indicative not only of the journalists writing these
pieces, but also the overarching attitudes that prevailed among the public during the Cold War
era.
Previous scholarship highlights the wide dissemination of articles written about the
Warsaw Pact invasion in the weeks following the event. A study following the New York Times
throughout 1968 exhibits notable trends: “More than 1200 articles over the course of the year
14
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were devoted to [Czechoslovakia], with the majority coming in July, August, and September.
Furthermore, an impressive 215 of those articles appeared on the front page of the newspaper. In
other terms, averaged out over the course of the entire year, almost six out of ten New York Times
front pages featured an article about Czechoslovakia.”15 Further analysis reveals that, while this
extent of coverage was most apparent in the New York Times, other major publications, including
the Wall Street Journal and the Christian Science Monitor, followed suit.16 Therefore, it is
necessary to interpret these numbers from the New York Times not as an exception to the rule, but
as part of a larger phenomenon developing in response to the crisis in Czechoslovakia.
Intentionally or unintentionally, the press’ inclination to highly publicize the events
unfolding in Prague ultimately had profound consequences on the trajectory of the election. In
the months following the invasion, Czechoslovakia was rivaled only by the Vietnam War as the
most important issue at the forefront of the presidential race. This can be attributed to the vast
coverage given to the Czech cause by the American press. Newspapers have long been
understood as a broader reflection of the discourse surrounding a given matter, including
coverage of the Warsaw Pact invasion. Thus, as the election loomed in the not-so-distant future,
the invasion emerged as a more prominent issue than most people anticipated, due in part to the
extensive attention the crisis received from the media. This was exacerbated by the fact that the
Warsaw Pact invasion was connected to a number of ongoing concerns relating to the Cold War
and nuclear tensions that had been ingrained in public discourse. To many Americans, it was
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indicative of a host of tensions fueled by the Cold War that positioned the Soviet Union and
communism as a threat to the United States.
The type of rhetoric employed by journalists and large publications is equally important,
if not more consequential than the absolute number of articles published, because it alludes to
concealed biases and opinions that a population may hold and constructs intentional narratives
for readers’ consumption. For these reasons, how a newspaper writes about a world affair, such
as the Warsaw Pact invasion, can greatly influence the public’s perception of the event. Grappling
with the portrayal of the Warsaw Pact invasion requires tracing the evolution of the media back to
the start of 1968 when the Prague Spring was beginning to take shape.
A reform movement that resulted from power shifting hands within the state, the Prague
Spring was a period in which liberalism and democracy flourished within Czechoslovakia.
Outside Czechoslovakia, the flourishing of democracy and liberalism during the Prague Spring
was a manifestation of Western political ideals positioned in contrast to Soviet control. 17 For this
reason, the values latent in the movement struck a chord with many Americans. As such, the
press illustrated both the Prague Spring and the subsequent invasion in a manner that appealed to
the ethos of the American people, thereby positioning themselves in support of Czechoslovakia.
Press coverage of the Warsaw Pact invasion underscored values that many Americans related to,
such as democracy, freedom, and liberty. This was achieved through the use of descriptive and
emotional language. One article from the New York Times in September of 1968 narrated: “It
began on Jan. 6 with the launching of a ‘democratic socialist revolution’ by a group of
Communist progressives led by a mild and ideologically quiet Slovak named Alexander Dubcek.
17
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It came to a clashing end at dawn of Aug. 21 when Soviet tanks and motorized infantry entered
Prague to smash the ideas of Czechoslovakia’s writers, artists, and philosophers.”18 This kind of
writing, riddled with emotion and sympathy, is reflective of other newspaper coverage
surrounding the invasion; the Los Angeles Times, for example, published a piece following the
invasion that urged Americans to “not overlook the acts of naked aggression [that] befell the
liberalized Commmunist government of Czechoslovakia.”19 Ultimately, depictions of this nature
radically shaped the narrative portrayed to the American people.
The extent to which these factors kindled a sense of passion among the American public
may be measured by the direct action that erupted in the form of protests and rallies. An article
from the Chicago Tribune published on August 25 spotlights one such example of a rally in
Illinois to support Czechoslovakia. The article features snippets of conversation with those in
attendance as well as government officials that elucidates the extent to which many Americans
were moved by the circumstances unfolding in Prague.20 Former Governor of Illinois Samuel
Shapiro echoed the sentiments of rally participants in his opening speech by praising “the spirit
of freedom [that] burns bright in the hearts of the Czechs . . . although Russian tanks roll into the
Czech nation, they cannot roll over the spirit that built that great nation.”21 For some, this
allegiance to Czechoslovakia could be attributed to their own Czech heritage; for others, it was
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pride in the “American” ideals that the people of Czechoslovakia were fighting for that fueled
their fervor.22
The power of the media to influence the psyche of the American people is revealed in the
potential it has to alter perceptions of not only the invasion but also the presidential candidates
and their response. By employing the kind of rhetoric illustrated above, newspapers and other
forms of print media amplified support for the citizens of Czechoslovakia while simultaneously
shifting public opinion of Johnson and the Democrats by highlighting the clear lack of response
from the administration. As Johnson and his advisors continued to shy away from any sort of
meaningful intervention in Czechoslovakia, bitterness directed toward Johnson and Humphrey
took hold. The nature of media coverage only heightened this bitterness. Because the media was
able to effectively garner support for Czechoslovakians in the following months by underscoring
the similar beliefs held by both the Czechs and Americans, the Warsaw Pact invasion became an
issue of high priority in the scope of the presidential race. As such, animosity toward Johnson
and his advisors only increased as their response to the invasion gave voters the impression that
the United States government did not support the values and ideals that they so readily touted as
their own.
Furthermore, newspaper articles indicate that the press centered the Warsaw Pact
invasion and Eastern European dynamics as issues that would take on pivotal roles not only
within the scope of the presidential election, but in the months beyond as well. An article
published by the Los Angeles Times titled “Czech Invasion Effect Weighed” purports this very
claim, arguing, “It is not difficult to envision the next President paying more attention to
American interests in Europe and around the immediate periphery of the Soviet-Warsaw Pact
22
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bloc and less to the Alliance for Progress, Africa, India, and—if Vietnam is settled—to Southeast
Asia.”23 While the Vietnam War was still positioned as the utmost priority, newspaper articles
discussed the Warsaw Pact invasion as being relevant for the next administration as well.
Framing it as an issue that would continue to be influential heightened its degree of relevance in
the election at hand. The invasion’s relevance in the context of the presidential election became
especially clear after the fact, as indicated by interviews with members of Johnson’s secretarial
staff. One such person, Phyllis Bonanno, recalls: “As you go into this last period, the two things
that always end up being most real in your memories are [Johnson] trying to make a deal with
the Soviets and Vietnam… the rest doesn’t seem very real to me because in fact those were the
two continuing underlying factors.”24 Bonanno’s personal reflection reveals that, both inside and
outside the White House, Soviet relations stood as the cornerstone of nearly all discussion in a
manner that underscored Johnson’s shortcomings in achieving this goal.
Had the media taken a different route in how it approached the invasion—perhaps only
publishing the occasional feature or employing language that appeared more facially neutral to
viewers—each candidate’s response to the crisis in Czechoslovakia might have held far less
consequence for their popularity among voters than it proved to hold. While discussions that
isolated the gravity of the Soviet’s invasion in Prague ultimately died down before election day
in November, the relevance of these events continued to fuel ongoing discussions of the Cold
War and nuclear disarmament that stood at the forefront of election debate. Thus, the
complexities of the Warsaw Pact invasion’s portrayal in print media during the fall of 1968
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denotes that there is a strong association between what newspapers chose to cover and the
importance of these topics to the outcome of an election.

V.

Preserving Johnson’s Legacy
As Vice President to Lyndon B. Johnson, Hubert Humphrey entered the election already

confronting a number of preconceived notions that the public held in regard to his character and
capabilities, which positioned Humphrey as a shadow of Johnson rather than a competent leader
of his own. Thus, Humphrey faced a dilemma while crafting his image during the campaigning
period. Speeches, public appearances, and interviews from this period reveal that Humphrey
seemed to buy into this predicament rather than attempting to distance himself from its
ramifications, a response that proved lethal for his success as presidential candidate.
The year of 1968 progressed with a number of developments in both the national and
international arena that called for strong and decisive leadership from the Johnson
administration, ranging from unforeseen assassinations of major public figures such as Martin
Luther King Jr. to unprecedented political unrest and riots. As such, the general public had come
to associate decisions and policies enacted by Johnson with Humphrey by virtue of their close
contact in office. The aftermath of this phenomenon became especially exaggerated by the time
the Soviet Union launched the Warsaw Pact invasion due to the negative impression President
Johnson left on the public. Voter dissatisfaction toward Johnson was caused and perpetuated by a
number of factors that would prove to be consequential throughout the election period.
First, the duration of the Vietnam War coupled with the United States’ heavy involvement
in the conflict had diminished the receptiveness of the American people toward the current
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administration. As time progressed the public more readily began to believe that (1) the United
States’ involvement in Vietnam was entirely unnecessary and (2) that Johnson and his advisors
were the sole cause of the mistakes made in Southeast Asia. 25 Outside of the turmoil inflicted by
the Vietnam War in both its staggering death toll and damage to the U.S. economy, 1968 was a
particularly challenging year for the Johnson administration. Kyle Longley argues in LBJ’s 1968:
Power, Politics, and the Presidency in America’s Year of Upheaval that the war, the
assassinations of Martin Luther King Jr. and Robert Kennedy, and the violent Democratic
National Convention that erupted in Chicago during the campaign period each made Johnson
look progressively worse.26 LBJ himself made the following claim regarding the tension of 1968:
“I recall vividly the frustration and genuine anguish I experienced so often in the final year of my
administration. I sometimes felt that I was living in a continuous nightmare.”27
The convoluted nature of these debacles instilled in the public the belief that Johnson and
his staff were making the wrong decision time and time again.28 Out of these frustrations grew
the tendency to identify a scapegoat for the state of affairs in the country, and—for many
people—Johnson and Humphrey were the conspicuous choice. An article from August 28, 1968
published in The Washington Post, Times Herald highlights the discontent emerging in regard to
both the administration and their capabilities: “It applies with special force to Johnson as the time
approaches to lay down power. For he can hardly hope for the place in history that he so
understandably yearns for if the end is a shambles with the running sore of the most unpopular
25
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war in America’s history.” 29 The Warsaw Pact invasion only furthered these beliefs as Johnson’s
perceived indifference to the event sparked outrage that the United States did not chastise the
Soviets for crossing borders. Given the fact that the invasion was carried out by a superpower
that the United States had been competing with for decades in the context of the Cold War, there
was an expectation that Johnson and his advisors would admonish the Soviet Union for invading
Prague and intervene directly.
Additionally, the United States had established a record of paternalism in Central and
Eastern European countries through the policy of bridge building that Johnson had dedicated
significant time to during his time in office. Initiatives for bridge building—programs designed to
promote a sense of cordialness between the East and the West with the ultimate goal of ending
communist control over the region—took shape in Czechoslovakia in 1964. Successes included
reducing export restrictions on hundreds of American goods, lifting travel restrictions as a result
of U.S. influence, and a signed determination to allow the Export-Import Bank to guarantee
commercial credits to Czechoslovakia.30 Johnson reinforced his proclaimed mission in a speech
given in Lexington during May of 1964: “We will continue to build bridges across the gulf which
has divided us from Eastern Europe. They will be bridges of increased trade, of ideas, of visitors,
and of humanitarian aid.”31
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The seeming devotion that Johnson and his administration displayed to the philosophy of
bridge building starting in the early 1960s and leading up to the end of the decade allows for a
better understanding of the confusion, anger, and frustration that the American public directed
toward Johnson’s administration following the invasion. For the entirety of Johnson’s term as
president, the American people watched as the administration poured time, money, and effort
into bridge building programs not only in Czechoslovakia but also among other Central and
Eastern European states such as Yugoslavia and Hungary. The fleeting response of the
administration when Soviet armies entered Prague represented a stark divergence from the norms
of the decade that championed U.S. involvement in nearly all aspects of Eastern European affairs.
While Johnson may have claimed to be critical of the Soviet Union throughout the speeches he
delivered in subsequent days, his actions in the following weeks indicated a sentiment fueled by
the President’s own intention to reach peace agreements with Moscow. This, for example, is
made clear in a document summarizing the 590th National Security Council meeting in which the
President’s advisors take a strong stance against admitting refugees from Czechoslovakia into the
United States following the invasion on the grounds that the Soviet Union could “argue that [the
United States], is in fact, intervening in Czechoslovakian affairs.”32 This fervent commitment
from both Johnson and his advisors to remain detached from the aftermath of the Warsaw
invasion reveals a reluctance from the President to accept that negotiations with the Soviet Union
would remain unresolved.
Furthering this sentiment, the Democratic Party Platform, published only six days after
the Soviet Union crossed Czech borders, reinforces the party and, subsequently, Humphrey’s
32
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commitment to arms control. The platform contends, “We must also recognize that the Soviet
Union and the United states still have a common interest in avoiding nuclear war and preventing
the spread of nuclear weapons… we must continue to work together.”33 While it was reasonable
for the party to continue to chip away at the negotiation efforts that had been culminating for
years with the Soviet Union, the timeline between the invasion and the release of the platform
displays an apparent lack of awareness on the part of the Democratic Party to take into account
that the invasion reignited anti-Soviet attitudes among the public.
Because of his role as Vice President, Humphrey was burdened with the negative
publicity directed toward Johnson and his administration throughout 1968 that was aggravated by
the Warsaw Pact invasion. Further analysis indicates that this had dire consequences on
Humphrey’s popularity that would impact the trajectory of the election to help Nixon secure
victory. Whether or not Humphrey actually had a sizable role to play in these blunders did not
matter. Johnson’s decisions might as well have been
his own, and these ties proved hard to break as the
election approached. Humphrey made matters worse
for himself by continuing to emphasize his loyalty to
President Johnson and, in some instances, even
outwardly endorsing Johnson’s unpopular policies.
Rhetoric exuding strong support for Johnson and his policies was apparent at the
Democratic National Convention when Humphrey accepted his nomination for the election. In
his speech he refers to his actions as “in the tradition of Lyndon B. Johnson,” later claiming that
33
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“President Johnson has accomplished more of the unfinished business of America than any of his
modern predecessors.”34 Conceptualized from the first moments of his candidacy, this stance

raised questions as to how Humphry would actually lead differently than Johnson, if at all. A
newspaper article from August 1968 indicates the use of similar language within the scope of the
Vietnam War as the journalist paraphrases: “In reply to a question about his differences with
President Johnson, Humphrey said people are always trying to stir up a ‘fight’ between himself
and Mr. Johnson but they have failed. Even on Vietnam, he said he had no criticism of the
policies Johnson had pursued.”35 While this instance was in reference to Southeast Asia, what
becomes apparent is that Humphrey continuously aligned himself closely with Johnson and
remained steadfast in his loyalty to the President on a number of policy issues.
Poll results from 1967 demonstrate the shift that took place during 1968 in regard to
candidate popularity as a result of these circumstances. A question from a Gallup poll
administered in 1967 asks, “Suppose the 1968 presidential election were being held today. If
Lyndon Johnson were the Democratic candidate and Richard Nixon were the Republican
candidate, which would you like to see win?”36 To this, 45 percent favored Jonson, 45 percent
favored Nixon, and 10 percent said they were either undecided or leaning strongly in one
direction.37 These poll results indicate that there is not a clear, strong sentiment leaning towards
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Nixon at this point in time. The same assertion can also be made about Johnson, who had not yet
announced that he would not be seeking reelection in the 1968 election.
In the same poll, similar attitudes are expressed that further isolate the turbulence of 1968
as a primary cause for the shift in public opinion that took place among voters. The first question
asked the following of respondents: “Do you approve or disapprove of the way Johnson is
handling his job as president?”38 In response, 45 percent approved, 41 percent disapproved, and
14 percent had no opinion.39 While the margin between approval and disapproval is not
significant, the mere fact that those who approve of Johnson’s leadership outweighs those who do
not illustrates a markedly different scenario from what Johnson and Humphrey confronted in the
final months of 1968. Conclusions can be drawn on the basis of these poll results that, at this
point in early 1967, prospects for the election between the Democratic and Republican party
seemed relatively equal, if not comparable. Thus, the uptick of support for Nixon that emerged as
the election neared in 1968 may be partially attributed to the errors of the Johnson administration
in handling the various crises throughout the year.
While Humphrey stood in Johnson’s shadow, the Vice President also did not fare well in
convincing the American public that he possessed the strong leadership skills necessary to lead
the country through times as challenging as these. The same article from The Washington Post,
Times Herald reiterates that many Americans felt apprehensive about Humphrey’s ability to lead.
The article asserts, “Humphrey, McCarthy, McGovern, Teddy Kennedy, they are good men. But
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measured against the turbulence shaking the foundations of order and civility everywhere, they
seem to fall short of the terrible demands of the time.”40
Similarly, an article from the New York Times published in August 1968 titled “Report on
the Candidate Named Humphrey” opens with a rhetorical question that raises concerns for the
viability of Humphrey’s campaign: “The great pseudo-issue of Hubert Horatio Humphrey’s
campaign for the Democratic nomination for President of the United States is, ‘Can he be his
own man?’”41 These newspaper articles reflect a more crushing perception that the public held of
Humphrey:not only was he equated to President Johnson in every aspect of policy and decision
making, but there was also a discernible amount of concern that Humphrey would not make an
adequate leader in the turbulent times that the United States faced. By not taking a definitive
stand against Johnson at any point during his term, especially during the period of unrest brought
on by the Warsaw Pact invasion both on the home front and abroad, Humphrey gave voters the
impression that he was too resigned to be in a position as authoritative as President. It is
reasonable to conclude that, as Vice President, Humphrey held a certain degree of obligation to
President Johnson to stand as a united front, a position that made it that much more challenging
to craft his own narrative in the race. Newspaper articles like this reflect that this would make it
difficult for Humphrey to achieve success as a presidential candidate.
Frustration elevated when, at least within the White House, clear warning signs became
apparent that signaled the escalation of tensions in Czechoslovakia in August of 1968. Leaders in
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the international community, including President Johnson, were aware that the Soviet Union was
closely monitoring the Prague Spring and how it was promoting democracy and liberalization
within the country. A record of a Cabinet Room meeting from July 29, 1968, about a month prior
to the invasion of Prague, detailed a conversation between President Johnson, Secretary of State
Dean Rusk, and Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford. In this document, Clifford claims, “This
[Czechoslovakia] is very prominent in my mind, as I look ahead at this time, Mr. President, with
the condition existing in Czechoslovakia, with existing in Vietnam—we’re waiting for the other
shoe to drop over there—I can see more danger in a visit with Kosygin at this time than I can see
benefit.”42 Transcripts from other Cabinet meetings around this time carry the same tone and line
of thought presented by Secretary Clifford in this meeting.43 These conversations reinforce the
notion that Johnson and those close to him were cognizant of the potential for tensions to
escalate in Prague, yet there was no firm plan of action in place when the invasion was ultimately
initiated. With this understanding, plans should have been in the works among NATO countries
and individual governments about how countries would aid Czechoslovakia in the event that the
Soviet Union would decide to take military action as they ultimately did. Fumbled responses
from the United States and the international community that manifested as silence over the
apparent breach of borders, however, show that this was the case in theory only.
Since there was already a clear association in the minds of the American public between
the President and Vice President and no concerted effort on Humphrey’s part to sever this
connection, Johnson’s balking during the Warsaw Pact invasion became Humphrey’s de facto
stance on the issue. A report published from the American Institute of Public Opinion in May
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1968 reveals the gravity of this challenge for Johnson; when individuals involved in the report
were asked for words and phrases to describe Humphrey, the most popular choices included
“Johnson’s shadow” and “just a puppet.”44 These impressions certainly altered the public’s
confidence in Humphrey’s ability to lead, but they also allude to Humphrey’s inability to
establish autonomy from his position in the previous administration. This kind of rhetoric laid
the groundwork for a scenario in which the anger and frustration that American citizens directed
toward Johnson in the wake of the invasion transferred to Humphrey. Humphrey inadvertently
branded himself as a continuation of LBJ’s legacy within the presidential race, and as a result
Humphrey inherited much of the discontent directed at Johnson in the previous months because
of the Warsaw Pact invasion. Had Humphrey been able to run a campaign that elevated his
autonomy from President Johnson and established him as a strong and decisive leader, the
landscape of the election may have evolved in favor of the Vice President. The public yearned
for a change from the Democratic Party and the seemingly ineffective policies of LBJ. Due to
Humphrey’s misguided approach, Nixon appeared better suited to meet the needs of the
American people.

VI.

The Opportunity for Political Posturing
A final component in analyzing how the invasion allowed Nixon to secure victory stems

from the opportunity that it presented for the Republican Party to benefit from the waning
popularity of the Democratic National Committee by posturing politically. To to Republican
Party in particular, the Warsaw Pact invasion was not simply a reflection of Czechoslovakia;
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rather, it represented a number of larger, ongoing concerns being hotly debated in the United
States among politicians and the general public alike:rising Cold War tensions, the global threat
of communism, and nuclear proliferation. Not only was the invasion carried out by the Soviet
Union, America’s notorious rival at the time, but it was also closely related to these contested
topics that the general public felt strongly about moving into the election. As such, the Warsaw
Pact invasion presented an opportunity in which the Republican Party, and more importantly
Nixon, could move strategically and contort the narrative of the invasion to align with their
ideologies. As the Republican Party had established themselves as staunch opponents of
communism, the Warsaw Pact invasion allowed Nixon to capitalize upon this reputation to give
the impression that he would provide exactly what the American people needed in that moment.
In the grand scheme of the election, the Republican Party cleverly chose not to treat the invasion
as an incident unfolding within a vacuum. Instead, they reinforced the perception of the Soviet
invasion as being related to the spread of communism in a manner that ultimately strengthened
their own position in the presidential race.
As early as his speech accepting his nomination for candidacy, Nixon was deliberate in
how he framed both himself and the Democratic Party, specifically Johnson and Humphrey.
Nixon, for example, began his speech with the following assertion: “We are going to win because
at a time that America cries out for the unity that this Administration has destroyed, the
Republican Party stands united before the nation.”45 This speech was given just a few weeks prior
to the invasion, yet it shows that Nixon readily employed rhetoric that admonished the
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Democratic Party for its shortcomings. In these campaign materials, the Republican Party takes a
stand as being vehemently against the spread of communism, especially in Central Europe; given
how closely intertwined the circumstances in Prague were with communism, the party reaped the
benefits of this position following the invasion.
Additionally, Nixon was quick to respond to the events transpiring in Czechoslovakia and
portrayed a sense of empathy for their plights in a manner that Johnson and Humphrey failed to
achieve. The same article from the Chicago Tribune that highlights a rally in Illinois supporting
the Czech people also recounts a telegram from Nixon that was read at the event:“For the third
time in recent history, Czechoslovakia has suffered the cruel fate of invasion by foreign powers.
The unprovoked invasion of a small state is an outrage against the conscience of the free world
and can only be condemned by all who value freedom.”46 It is important to recognize that Nixon
was in an entirely different position than Humphrey and Johnson and did not necessarily have to
meet the same criteria to be looked upon favorably by voters. As President and Vice President,
the public expected a form of action that matched the sentiments being put forth by Humphrey
and Johnson. For Nixon, however, saluting the bravery of the Czech people was enough to
solidify a base of support.
Polls from this period provide strong evidence as to public opinion regarding the
candidates. For instance, a Gallup Poll recorded only two weeks following the invasion
underscores the sentiment that the public perceived the Republican Party as better fit to address
the challenges confronting the country. Responses from those polled indicate that 51 percent of
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voters believed Nixon was better equipped to handle world affairs than Humphrey.47 Additionally,
38 percent of respondents thought that Nixon was the better choice for president, compared to
only 29 percent in favor of Humphrey.48 While a myriad of factors certainly contributed to the
sentiments reflected in these polls, the position that Nixon took against the Democratic Party as
the election approached was consequential in shaping these viewpoints.
The same report from the American Institute of Public Opinion also sheds light on how
the public perceived each man’s ability to take on a position of leadership. When prompted to list
positive words that most authentically represented Humphrey, participants’s top choices included
“plenty of ability,” “sincere,” “honest,” and “full of life.”49 In comparison, the descriptors that
appeared with most frequency to describe Nixon included “competent,” “experienced,” and “a
man of action.”50 It stands out that the words voters associated with Humphrey related strongly to
his character and moral compass, while those describing Nixon tended to encompass his ability
to lead. This report ultimately reveals that, while many voters perceived Humphrey as having a
strong moral character and empathized with him as a person, they did not necessarily believe that
he was equipped to serve as a president with the ability to stand up to the Soviet Union. On the
contrary, there is a firm belief that resonates with those involved in this report that Nixon was
qualified professionally to guide the United States through difficult decisions, a notion that was
backed up by the deliberate and intentional rhetoric Nixon utilized in public appearances,
rhetoric that was then exacerbated by the media. Thus, it can be inferred based on this report that,
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to a certain degree, Nixon and the Republican Party were succeeding in their goal to portray
themselves as a party that was aggressive enough to tackle the spread of communism and
confront the Soviet Union head on.
Finally, the degree of success that Nixon experienced through political posturing can be
attributed to the methods by which he
branded himself as a different kind of
leader from what the United States
had experienced in previous years.
Given the bitterness and frustration
that many Americans felt toward the
Johnson administration by mid-1968, it was in Nixon’s best interest to present himself as
bringing something new to the table. This was something Nixon emphasized in his nomination
acceptance and rallies across the country. At the Republican National Convention in early
August, Nixon positioned the tone of his campaign by drawing parallels between Humphrey and
Johnson while also demarcating his own leadership when he said,“And this great group of
Americans, the forgotten Americans, and others know that the great question America must
answer by their votes in November is this: Whether we shall continue for four more years the
policies of the last five years.”51 Utilizing this kind of language urged voters to reflect on the
previous administration, specifically their shortcomings, and consider a political figure who
would break from the norms of the previous leadership. Ultimately, this sort of rhetoric,
51
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combined with the direct association that the American people made between Johnson and
Humphrey, alienated the Vice President.
Similar sentiments were expressed at public appearances throughout his campaign. A
newspaper article published in The New York Times at the end of September recalls an
appearance Nixon made in Wisconsin to Republican party workers in which he asserted,
“[Johnson and Humphrey gave] the same old signals and the same old plays of the last four
years… and we haven’t won a game. It’s time to win a few games.”52 In both his speech delivered
at the Republican National Conventional and more informal gatherings such as the one
highlighted in this article, Nixon effectively highlights the shortcomings of the Johnson
administration and argues that electing Humphrey as president would only result in the same
failures that the country experienced under Johnson. Adopting this approach provided Nixon the
opportunity to set forth a new vision for the country that could be achieved under his leadership,
one that was markedly different from what Humphrey had to offer and diverged dramatically
from that of the previous four years.
Newspaper articles, speeches, and telegrams demonstrate the calculated decisions that
Nixon made throughout his campaign that allowed him to engage in successful political
posturing. In a discussion of the tactics utilized by the Nixon campaign at the Republican
National Convention, Cott argues, “The Nixon convention strategy was consistent procedurally
and substantively with the pattern set for the campaign as a whole. Nixon was presented as the
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statesman candidate, above the fray, as the logical, inevitable choice.”53 While Cott analyzes the
Nixon campaign as it appeared via television, Nixon’s speeches and other public appearances
remained uniform with the persona presented above. In her analysis, Cott reveals the meticulous
care that Nixon and his campaign advisors took to consider the context of the world stage in his
public appearances during the race by citing a change Nixon made in his discussion of the
Republican Party platform in the time after the invasion in which he edited out his desire to enter
an era of negotiations.54 Cott states, “This latter omission was considered especially important
since the half-hour program was to be telecast the first of three times on the weekend after the
Russians had invaded Czechoslovakia. It was felt that the country would not have been receptive
to this proposal, made only a few weeks earlier at the Republican convention.”55 This kind of
tactic reveals a cleverness on Nixon’s part in putting himself in the position of the American
people to decipher what voters wanted to hear and what might not be well received given the
context of the invasion. While Humphrey’s lack of consideration for public opinion was almost
haphazard and unwitting, Nixon seemed keenly aware that the Warsaw Pact invasion would open
doors for the Republican Party to push an anti-communist narrative that would further their
agenda and secure victory.

VII.
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From the start, the 1968 presidential election was sure to be contested given the
tumultuous decade that preceded it. The complexity of the election, however, was only
intensified by the aggressive and unanticipated nature of the Warsaw Pact invasion. After decades
of Cold War tension and hostility, Johnson had begun to set the stage for monumental changes to
take place between the United States and the Soviet Union. As a result of his commitment to
nuclear proliferation, peace negotiations were on the horizon and many Americans believed that
the Soviet Union was no longer the threat they had once considered it to be. The shock of the
invasion toppled this notion quickly. Johnson was at a crossroad—move forward with the summit
scheduled in October with Moscow and risk being labeled as a pawn of the Soviet Union or take
a stand against Soviet aggression demonstrated by the Warsaw Pact invasion and lose everything
he had worked for that would secure his legacy. It was clear that no matter what route the
administration embarked upon it was sure to isolate a section of voters.
Humphrey’s loyalty to Johnson—and his policies—as Vice President would hurt him in
the election as Johnson chose to remain detached and let the people of Czechoslovakia settle the
matter for themselves. Americans were shocked, and it was ultimately Humphrey that took the
blame for this decision in the election. There was little concerted effort on Humphrey’s part to
remain autonomous from Johnson, and his overexaggerated endorsement of Johnson and his
policies further deteriorated his image in the eyes of the public. To voters, Humphrey was merely
the epitome of a tradition and status quo that the country was desperate to depart from.
The media was another important factor that shaped the outcome of the race.
Publications employed deeply emotional rhetoric that effectively linked the values of the Czech
people to those of the Americans. The actions of the press fostered a mindset among readers that
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if one was not with the Czech cause, one was against it. Johnson and Humphrey clearly fell into
the latter category as a result of their perceived inaction. In addition, newspapers highlighted the
rallies and demonstrations taking place across the country that further escalated emotions and
shaped public opinion. These actions ultimately contributed to the anger that Americans directed
toward Johnson and Humphrey come election day.
Finally, Nixon’s win in relation to the Warsaw Pact invasion can, in part, be attributed to
the fact that he crafted his image far more strategically than Humphrey by exaggerating the
Republican Party’s commitment to anti-communism. Nixon ultimately maintained a sense of
agency over how he was perceived by voters in a manner that Humphrey was not able to achieve
in relation to anti-communist action, thereby contributing to the public’s belief that Humphrey
was not a decisive candidate. After a decade filled with challenge after challenge for the United
States, there seemed to be a consensus that the country needed firm leadership, and polls of
public opinion support the notion that voters believed Nixon could meet this need.
For all that Humphrey failed to do in response to the invasion, it is equally important to
acknowledge that a number of other factors also contributed to the downfall of the Democratic
Party in the election. The apparent division among Democrats in 1968 hindered the party’s
ability to reach a consensus on which candidate to support in the election. Severed by the turmoil
of the Vietnam War, the party saw a number of competing personalities vie for the spot as the
Democratic candidate in the earlier half of the year, including Eugene McCarthy and Robert F.
Kennedy.56 This abundance of competitors furthered the division by splitting the party’s vote over
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which man to support. As such, Humphrey already confronted stacked odds when he won the
candidacy in August as he became the frontrunner for a party that lacked the unity to put their
full support behind him. While the Warsaw Pact invasion certainly played a hand in Nixon’s
victory, other factors remained at play that, in retrospect, made Humphrey’s defeat seem
inevitable.
Amidst the chaos of the Warsaw Pact invasion, there is a lesson to be learned regarding
the value of a robust international response that world leaders still lack. As the Soviet Union
moved into Czechoslovakia, NATO, the United Nations, and other superpowers sat idly by for
the sake of attaining a certain degree of peace. There was a growing consensus that it was a
matter for the Czech people to handle. Although there was verbal opposition to the invasion, the
rest of the world quickly fell into a state of compliance. In the present day, over 50 years later,the
world finds itself in an eerily similar set of circumstances as Russia invades Ukraine. While the
United States is presently arming Ukraine for military offensives against Russia, a stark contrast
from what unfolded in Czechoslovakia in 1968, there is a similar attitude from the international
community that seeks to maintain peace and security at the cost of direct intervention.
As the year drew to a close in November of 1968, the American public seemed desperate
for stability in a year filled with one dilemma after another. Humphrey’s pivotal role in the
previous administration forged connections in the minds of voters that he would merely continue
LBJ’s turbulence. Nixon, on the other hand, represented something different, a divergence from
the chaos that had become the norm. As Nixon offered the dependability that had been lacking
from the previous administration, the public flocked to support him and the Republican Party
come election day. For all these reasons, the fate of the Czech people as a result of the invasion
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was not just their own, but Americans’ too as it shifted the trajectory of the race in favor of
Richard Nixon.
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